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1. Introduction
Some of the key IaaS clouds features are multi-
tenancy, elasticity and on demand availability. In
a modern virtualised environment dynamic re-
source management allows tenants to create, de-
stroy or reconfigure virtual resources with un-
precedented ease.
However, the same characteristics that make
cloud environments agile and dynamic, also af-
fect the ability of a security monitoring frame-
work to successfully detect attacks in outsourced
information systems [6] and sometimes introduce
new security vulnerabilities.
Large scale security frameworks include var-
ious components (firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, log collectors etc.) that have different
functionalities and are located in different areas
or even outside the virtual infrastructure. Con-
sequently, changes in the number of virtual ma-
chines (e.g. addition of new instances) or in their
placement (e.g. live migration) require the se-
curity monitoring system to be adapted. To be
able to successfully cope with the high frequency
of occurring changes, a cloud-tailored security
monitoring infrastructure should be able to adapt
its components with little to no human interven-
tion. In opposition to a typical host- or network-
level firewall which filters network traffic based
on a list of rules that use IP addresses and ports,
application-level firewalls operate based on an
access policy that is defined from a white list of
processes that are allowed to make connections.
This fine-grained level of filtering is achievable
because application-level firewalls have a com-
plete overview of the host in which they are run-
ning. Unfortunately, the conventional design of
application-level firewalls has an inherent defi-
ciency: limited isolation between the firewall and
vulnerable applications which increases the prob-
ability of a successful attack that disables the fire-
wall (i.e removing hooks from packet filtering
functions). Hence, an important question is: Can
we retain the same level of increased visibility
while limiting the attack surface between any in-
fected application and a trusted application-level
firewall?
To address this question we designed and im-
plemented AL-SAFE a two-level application-
level firewall that operates outside of the virtual
machine it is monitoring in a completely separate
domain. By leveraging virtual machine introspec-
tion we retain the same level of ”inside-the-host”
visibility while introducing a high-confidence
barrier between the firewall and the attacker’s ma-
licious code.
Our firewall consists of two different compo-
nents that operate at distinct infrastructure lev-
els: an edge firewall responsible for filtering net-
work traffic between the outside world and the
cloud infrastructure, and a virtual switch-level
firewall that filters traffic in the virtual switch of
each physical host. Both components, executed
outside the untrusted virtual machine, become
application-level firewalls by using virtual ma-
chine introspection.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows:
Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 out-
lines our frameworks’ objectives and architec-
ture. Section 4 focuses on implementation details
while Section 5 concludes the paper focusing on
evaluation and future work.
2. Related Work
Virtual machine introspection is a mechanism
that allows, through memory mapping, indirect
inspection of and control over the current state of
a virtual machine from software running outside
of the virtual machine. The approach is based on
building higher-level semantics that can be ac-
cessed by a monitoring application (data struc-
tures, files) from the mapped memory pages. In
this section we discuss various security applica-
tions that leverage the isolation properties offered
by virtual machine introspection.
Garfinkel and Rosenblum [1] were the first
ones to introduce the concept of virtual machine
introspection, and used it to implement a secure
host-based IDS. Livewire enables an IDS that is
located in the physical host to monitor the state
of the operating system in a VM by mapping the
guest’s physical page frames to its own address
space.
Joshi et al [2] created a system called IntroVirt
that can assess whether a system has been com-
promised through a known pre-existing vulnera-
bility based on introspection and replay.
Both Livewire and IntroVirt incorporate vir-
tual machine introspection for designing an IDS
hence providing passive network monitoring and
not addressing dynamic changes in the virtual in-
frastructure.
Amazon EC2 provides IaaS cloud tenants with
firewalls, named security groups [5], that are lo-
cated outside the virtual machines and offer pro-
tection from attacks originating outside the cloud
infrastructure by filtering inbound traffic only.
The security groups are oblivious to the type and
nature of the tenant applications thus making fine-
grained application-based network traffic filtering
impossible. Furthermore it is unclear whether the
cloud provider adds rules to the security groups.
The authors of xFilter [3] utilize virtual ma-
chine introspection for creating a self protection
mechanism against stepping-stone-attacks [4] that
filters outgoing packets at the level of the hypervi-
sor. xFilter cannot handle cloud oriented dynamic
events (such as VM migration) and only filters
outgoing traffic.
Our goal is to design a self-adaptable intro-
spection-based application level firewall that can
filter inbound and outgoing traffic based on a
list of legitimate applications that are allowed to
make connections. We leverage virtual machine
introspection for retaining the high degree of vis-
ibility of an application level firewall while mak-
ing it tamper resistant to any user- or kernel-level
malware that may be present in the monitored
VM.
3. Overiew of AL-SAFE
We propose a two-level introspection-based ap-
plication level firewall with a self-adaptable rule-
set. The reconfiguration of the enforced ruleset
depends upon changes in two different layers:
Service layer (addition or removal of services)
and Virtual Infrastructure layer (e.g. VM creation,
deletion or migration). In this section we out-
line AL-SAFE objectives together with our threat
model and a detailed description of AL-SAFE ar-
chitecture.
3.1 AL-SAFE Objectives
AL-SAFE should satisfy the following proper-
ties:
• Self adaptation: the enforced ruleset should be
configured with respect to dynamic events that
occur in a cloud environment. These high fre-
quency events include modifications in the vir-
tual infrastructure such as VM creation, dele-
tion and migration.
• Service-based customisation: the ruleset on
both firewall levels should be reconfigured in
order to allow network traffic that originates
from the legitimate tenant-approved services.
• Tamper-resistance: our two-level firewall should
continue to function reliably and block all po-
tentially malicious connections even if an at-
tacker gains control of a monitored VM. In
particular, the reconfiguration of the enforced
ruleset should not rely on information origi-
nating from components installed inside the
monitored guest as these can be unreliable.
• Cost minimisation: the overall cost in terms of
resource consumption must be kept at a mini-
mal level both for the tenants and the provider.
AL-SAFE achieves this by enabling sharing of
the two-level firewall between tenants.
3.2 Threat model
We consider software attacks only that originate
both from malicious VMs as well as from out-
side the cloud infrastructure. However we con-
sider that the provider infrastructure cannot be
corrupted.
3.3 Two-level Firewall Architecture
AL-SAFE is a secure, introspection-based, two-
level, application level firewall. It is part of our
self-adaptable security monitoring framework for
IaaS clouds [12]. AL-SAFE rulesets are auto-
matically reconfigured upon the occurrence of
changes in two different levels: the cloud infras-
tructure (e.g. VM migration, creation or dele-
tion) and the list of services running inside the
monitored VM. AL-SAFE consists of five major
components as depicted in figure 1: the snapshot-
ting/introspection component (VMI), the Infor-
mation Extraction Agent (IEA), the Rule Gener-
ators (RG) and two separate firewalls. An edge
firewall (EF) filters network traffic between the
outside world and the cloud infrastructure, and
a virtual switch-level firewall (SLF) filters traffic
in the virtual switch of each physical host. The
components are run by the cloud provider.
The flow of the process which is executed peri-
odically is as follows: first, the VMI takes a snap-
shot of the monitored guest and introspects the
memory image in order to obtain the list of pro-
cesses attempting to make network connections.
Second, the IEA extracts all the necessary infor-
mation for generating filtering rules and propa-
gates it to two separate Rule Generators. Finally
the RGs create the switch-level and edge firewall
rules and inject them in the separate firewalls. The
IEA takes as a parameter a tenant defined white
list of processes that are allowed to send and re-
ceive packets.
The Snapshotting/Introspection component takes
a snapshot of the VM in order to provide a coher-
ent memory view to the introspection process that
will follow. The component iterates over the list
of running processes and checking whether a file
in the list of open files per process corresponds
to a network socket. If this is true it extracts the
process name, the pid as well as source and desti-
nation port, IP and protocol. The time elapsed be-
tween two consecutive snapshots/introspections
is defined by the tenant and can be dynamically
adapted by the Adaptation Manager [12].
The Information Extraction Agent compares
the list of processes that attempt to send/receive
network packets with a white list of processes
that are allowed to make connections. The Adap-
tation Manager [12] is responsible for sharing the
white list with the Information Extraction Agent
through a secure channel. The IEA allows the
connection if it finds a match and blocks the con-
nection otherwise. The IEA propagates the con-
nection information together with an allow or
block action to the Rule Generators. Each RG
creates the corresponding rule utilising all avail-
able information such as source port, source IP
address, destination port, destination IP address
and protocol. The generated rules are then in-
jected in the separate firewalls.
The Switch-level firewall filters network pack-
ets at the level of virtual switch based on a prede-
fined list of rules. If the rule’s action is to block
the connection it drops the packet otherwise the
packet is injected in the network. A switch-level
filtering offers the possibility of blocking mali-
cious traffic originating from inside the cloud in-
frastructure at an early stage thus significantly re-
ducing the load of monitored traffic in the remain-
ing security probes.
The Edge firewall is located at the edge of the
virtual infrastructure in a separate network probe.
It filters traffic based on a set of rules that are re-
sponsible for mediating the traffic directed to and
from all the VMs in the virtual infrastructure. By
placing the edge firewall in a stand alone network
device we ensure that external malicious traffic
will be blocked at an early stage while there will
be no CPU penalties in the deployed VMs.
4. Implementation
We implemented a prototype of AL-SAFE us-
ing KVM hypervisor and a Linux guest operat-
ing system in a private cloud. We used Open-
Stack [7] as the cloud management system and
Open vSwitch [8] as a multilayer virtual switch.
A description of the implementation for each
component of AL-SAFE follows.
• For the snapshotting/introspection component
we utilized the LibVMI [10] introspection
framework. For performing the correlation be-
tween running processes and open sockets in-
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Figure 1. The AL-SAFE architecture
side the monitored VM we deployed Volatility
Memory Forensics [11] framework.
• For the switch-level firewall we utilized the
filtering capabilities offered by Open vSwitch
while for the edge firewall we deployed Nfta-
bles [9] packet filtering framework in a stand
alone Linux host.
• Both the Information Extraction Agent and
the Rule Generators were implemented in
python. The switch level rule generator pro-
duces OpenFlow filtering rules while the edge
firewall rule generator produces Nftables-com-
patible rules. The created rulesets are injected
in parallel in the EF and SLF firewalls.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
We have designed a secure application level fire-
wall that is located outside the VM but is able to
retain through virtual machine introspection, the
same degree of visibility as an ”inside-the-host”
solution. Our firewall filters traffic at two distinct
points in the virtual infrastructure and is able to
adapt the enforced ruleset based on changes in
the virtual infrastructure as well as in the list of
services running inside the monitored VMs.
We are currently conducting a thorough eval-
uation of our approach focusing on both perfor-
mance and correctness aspects. We plan to ad-
dress cost minimisation by combining the secu-
rity monitoring of the tenants and provider infras-
tructure. We also intend to expand our architec-
ture by including other types of devices such as
log collectors and aggregators.
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